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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Carlos Esquivel appeals from the order of the district court summarily 
dismissing his second amended petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Underlvina Criminal Proceedinqs 
The factual background and course of the criminal proceedings are set 
forth by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Esquivel, Docket No. 30424, 2004 
Unpublished Opinion, No. 706, *I-2 (Idaho Ct. App. December 2, 2004) (referred 
to herein as "Esquivel I"): 
The victim in this case was a close friend of Esquivel's 
stepdaughter. Between 1999 and June 2001, when the victim was 
approximately eight and nine years old, Esquivel repeatedly 
engaged in lewd conduct with the victim when she visited 
Esquivel's home. The victim disclosed this conduct to a family 
friend in 2002 and authorities were notified. As a result, Esquivel 
was charged with three counts of lewd conduct with a minor under 
the age of sixteen, I.C. § 18-1508, and one count of sexual abuse 
of a minor under the age of sixteen, I.C. § 18-1506. Esquivel 
denied all allegations, and the case proceeded to trial. Following 
verdicts of guilty on ail charges, Esquivel filed a motion for acquittal, 
alleging that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's 
verdicts as to counts one and three--that Esquivel had 
genital-to-genital contact with the victim. [footnote omitted] The 
district court denied Esquivel's motion. Esquivel was sentenced to 
concurrent unified terms of thirty years, with minimum periods of 
confinement of fifteen years, for lewd conduct and a concurrent 
unified term of fifteen years, with a minimum period of confinement 
of five years, for sexual abuse. Esquivel filed a Rule 35 motion 
requesting reduction of his sentences, which was denied. Esquivel 
appeals, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion 
for judgment of acquittal, that his sentences are excessive, and that 
the denial of his Rule 35 motion was in error. 
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Esquivel's motion for 
acquittal, explaining: 
The victim testified that she frequently spent the night at Esquivel's 
home and that on these visits, she would sleep on her stomach in a 
bed by herself. During the night, Esquivel would enter the room 
without clothing, pull down the victim's pajamas, lay on top of her, 
and "use his private to touch hers." The victim testified that 
Esquivel rubbed his private on her bottom and indicated that by 
"private," she meant Esquivel's penis and that by "bottom," she 
meant in between her legs. The victim responded affirmatively 
when the prosecutor asked her whether in between her legs also 
was called "vagina." However, the victim further stated that 
Esquivel placed his penis between her legs, that she did not feel his 
penis touching her vaginal area, and that he would rub his penis 
between her legs where her bottom was. On cross-examination, 
Esquivel attempted to clarify whether the victim meant the "part she 
poops with" or the "part she pees with" when testifying about her 
bottom. 
Esquivel asserts that, although the victim's testimony 
supports the claim Esquivel had contact with the victim's anus, it 
was unreasonable for the jury to conclude that Esquivel had contact 
with the victim's genital area. We disagree. Genitalia is defined as 
"the organs of the reproductive system; esp[ecially]: the external 
genital organs." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 946 (3d ed. 1993). Therefore, the victim's statement 
that she did not feel Esquivel touch her vagina is not inconsistent 
with genital-to-genital contact having occurred. Further, the jury 
could have reasonably concluded that, when Esquivel rubbed his 
penis in between the victim's legs, Esquivel's genitals came into 
contact with the genitals of the victim. Finally, the jury could have 
also reasonably concluded that the victim, who was eleven years 
old at the time of trial, possessed an unsophisticated understanding 
of human anatomy and was confused and embarrassed when 
trying to clarify where Esquivel touched her. It was within the 
province of the jury to decide what inferences were to be drawn 
from the evidence and to resolve any conflicts in the testimony. We 
conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the jury's 
finding that Esquivel had genital-to-genital contact with the victim. 
Therefore, the district court did not error in denying Esquivel's 
motion for judgment of acquittal. 
(Esquivel I, pp.3-4.) The court of appeals affirmed Esquivel's concurrent unified 
sentences of thirty years, with fifteen years fixed, and the trial court's order 
denying Esquivel's motion for reduction of sentence. (Esquivel I, pp.4-5.) 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Prior Post-Conviction Proceedings 
On July 13, 2005, Esquivel filed a petition for post-conviction relief, 
alleging seventeen claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (if32689 R., pp.4- 
lo),  and a motion for appointment of counsel (if32689 R., pp.41-44). The district 
court denied Esquivel's motion for appointment of counsel (if32689 R., pp.53-61), 
concluding: "[Blased on the record, Esquivel's Petition and the law, the Court 
finds that the Petition is frivolous on its face and is not a proceeding that a 
reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own 
expense." (if32689 R., p.60 (internal citation and repeated text omitted).) 
Esquivel subsequently filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief, 
alleging six claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel: (1) failing to request 
an order for a polygraph examination (if32689 R., pp.73, 74); (2) failing to 
"subpoena witnesses, introduce props, and abuse of discretion" (if32689 R., 
pp.73, 74-75, 79); (3) failing to ask CARES unit staff about the number of 
interviews in sex abuse cases each had conducted and the use of stuffed 
animals rather than anatomically correct dolls in the CARES video (if32689 R., 
pp.73, 75-80); (4) failing to object to the use of stuffed animals in the CARES 
video; (5) failing to request an independent expert on the frequency of children's 
false abuse claims (if32689 R., pp.73, 80); and (6) failing to request an 
independent psychosexual evaluation (if32689 R., pp.73, 80-82). Esquivel also 
alleged his appellate counsel was ineffective in not arguing abuse of discretion 
on appeal. (#32689 R., pp.74, 82.) Esquivel filed a renewed motion for 
appointment of counsel (if32689 R., pp.84-86), which the district court denied, 
concluding, in light of the record of the criminal case, that Esquivel's amended 
petition was frivolous and the court "does not find any claim of possible merit has 
been alleged" (#32689 R., pp.93-100). The district court gave notice of its intent 
to dismiss the amended petition (#32689 R., pp.108-117), and two-and-one-half 
months later, the district court summarily dismissed Esquivel's petition (#32689 
R., pp.132-142). 
Esquivel appealed, arguing the district court erred in denying his motion 
for appointment of counsel because two of his arguments raised the possibility of 
valid claims that entitled him to counsel. (#32689 R., pp.159-164) In State v. 
Esauivel, Docket No. 32689, 2007 Unpublished Opinion No. 541 (Idaho Ct. App. 
August 3, 2007) (referred to herein as "Esquivel [I"), the court of appeals affirmed 
in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The 
court concluded the "district court did not err in denying appointment of counsel 
to assist Esquivel in his post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
based upon counsel's failure to request Esquivel undergo a polygraph 
examination." (Esquivel II, pp.7-8.) The court did conclude, however, that the 
district court erred in denying Esquivel's request for appointment of counsel to 
assist him in pursuing his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his 
claim that his attorney should have requested an independent psychosexual 
evaluation. (Esquivel II, pp.7-8.) Specifically, the court found the district court 
erred because Esquivel's application "allege[d] facts which raise the possibility of 
a valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim in regard to his psychosexual 
evaluation." (Esquivel 11, p.8.) The court of appeals reasoned that Esquivel's 
"application alleges facts indicating the possibility that his court-ordered 
psychosexual evaluation was inadequately conducted" and that "[tlhe record 
before this Court on appeal demonstrates that the results of Esquivel's 
psychosexual evaluation were considered by the district court in making its 
sentencing decision and was a factor contributing to the length of the sentence." 
(Esquivel II, pp.6-7.) 
As a result, the court of appeals reversed "the district court's summary 
dismissal and denial of counsel as to this claim" and instructed the "district court 
to appoint counsel to assist Esquivel in pursuing the post-conviction claim that 
his counsel was ineffective for failing to arrange an independent psychosexual 
evaluation or otherwise mitigate the effects of the court-ordered evaluation." 
(Esquivel 11, p.7.) 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Current Post-Conviction Proceedinqs 
On remand, the district court appointed counsel, who filed an amended 
post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because trial 
counsel failed to properly advise Esquivel regarding his Fifth Amendment rights 
in submitting to a psychosexual evaluation. (#35792 R., pp.25-27.) In response, 
the state conceded "the defense attorney in this case did not advise [Esquivel] of 
[his] Fifth Amendment Right to silence during the psychosexual examination." 
(#35792 R., p.35.) The state asserted, however, that Esquivel's claim should be 
dismissed because Esquivel failed to meet his burden of showing prejudice "as a 
result of that failure by defense counsel." (#35792 R., p.35.) 
On July 15, 2008, following briefing, the district court filed an Order 
Conditionally Dismissing Second Amended Petition For Post-Conviction Relief. 
(#35792 R., pp.66-77.) In that order the district court noted "Esquivel made no 
incriminating statements to the psychosexual evaluator and, in fact, he continued 
to deny responsibility, just as he had at trial" and that the "statements he made to 
the examiner were consistent with those made at trial." (#35792 R., p.68.) The 
district court further concluded "the Court learned nothing it did not already know" 
in reviewing the psychosexual evaluation and, therefore, that Esquivel had not 
shown a reasonable probability that, "but for his trial counsel's professional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different as required by 
Strickland." (#35792 R., p.77.) In his response to the order, Esquivel did not 
directly address the district court's conditional dismissal, but rather "adopt[ed] all 
prior pleadings and arguments advanced by the Petitioner in support of the 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. . . ." (#35792 R., p.79.) 
On September 16, 2008, the district court dismissed Esquivel's second 
amended petition. (#35792 R., pp.81-94.) The district court specifically stated 
that although it mentioned the psychosexual evaluation at sentencing it did not 
rely on the report. (#35792 R., p.92.) The trial court explained: 
This Court determined Esquivel's sentence based on the 
testimony he gave and the evidence produced at trial and not on 
the psychosexual evaluation. The psychosexual evaluation did not 
increase or reduce his sentence. Esquivel did not receive a 
different sentence, either enhanced reduced, based on his 
refusal to cooperate in the psychosexual evaluation or because of 
its contents. It was his failure to accept responsibilitv that 
demonstrated rehabilitation was unlikely. 
(#35792 R., p.92 (emphasis in original).) Accordingly, the district court dismissed 
Esquivel's post-conviction petition. (#35792 R., p.93.) 
Esquivel timely appealed. (#35792 R., p.95.) 
ISSUES 
Esquivel states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Does the law of the case doctrine prohibit the district court 
from deciding in direct opposition to the Court of Appeals' 
holding that counsel's deficient performance was not 
prejudicial? 
2. In the first alternative, given the record, did the district court 
err in determining that counsel's deficient performance was 
not prejudicial? 
3. In the second alternative, should this case be analyzed, not 
as an ineffective assistance of counsel case, but rather as a 
case involving a denial of the state and federal constitutional 
rights against compelled testimony, and under such analysis, 
is reversal required because the state cannot show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that denying Carlos his constitutional right 
to remain silent was harmless error? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Esquivel failed to establish that the district court committed reversible 
error in summarily dismissing his claim for post-conviction relief? 
2. Esquivel claims the district court erred because his attorney's failure to 
advise him prior to taking the psychosexual is not ineffective assistance of 
counsel but an independent violation of his right to silence. Where 
Esquivel failed to raise this claim below, should this Court decline to 
consider the merits? Alternatively, even if Esquivel had raised this issue 
below, has Esquivel failed to show that his right to remain silent was 
violated or that the deprivation was not harmless? 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
The District Court Properly Determined That Esquivel Failed To Meet His Burden 
Of Establishing Preiudice 
A. Introduction 
Esquivel contends the district court's determination that Esquivel was not 
prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to advise him of his right to remain silent 
during his psychological evaluation was in error. Esquivel makes two arguments 
regarding this claim. First, Esquivel argues the ldaho Court of Appeals already 
ruled on the issue and, therefore, under the law of the case doctrine, the district 
court was precluded from concluding there was no prejudice. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.6-9.) Second, Esquivel argues the district court's determination that there 
was no prejudice is clearly erroneous. (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) Both claims 
fail. 
Esquivel's argument that the law of the case doctrine applies fails because 
the ldaho Court of Appeals did not articulate a principle or rule of law that 
controls the present issue. Here, under the summaiy dismissal standard, it was 
Esquivel's burden to show that his sentence would have been different if he 
would have been advised of his rights prior to his completing the psychosexual 
evaluation. The court of appeals did not previously address whether Esquivel 
had met this burden. 
Esquivel's argument that he established a claim of prejudice fails because 
the district court's determination that Esquivel failed to meet his burden of 
showing that his sentence would have been different had he been informed of his 
rights regarding the psychosexual evaluation was correct. Esquivel failed to 
present evidence creating a material issue of fact on whether he would have 
received a different sentence had he been advised of his rights prior to 
completing the psychosexual evaluation. The district court explicitly stated in its 
order summarily dismissing Esquivel's claim, that "[tlhe psychosexual evaluation 
did not increase or reduce [Esquivel's] sentence." (#35792., p.92.) Accordingly, 
Esquivel's claims of error are without merit. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 ldaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 ldaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 ldaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
C. The Law Of The Case Doctrine Is Not Applicable Where The ldaho Court 
Of Appeals' Determination Was Made Pursuant To A Different Legal 
Standard Applied To A Different Legal Issue 
Esquivel first argues that the district court's determination that there was 
no prejudice was in error because, he claims, the ldaho Court of Appeals already 
ruled on the matter. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-9.) Esquivel claims that pursuant to 
the "law of the case" doctrine, the district court was required to find prejudice 
because of this Court's prior ruling that Esquivel raised "the possibility of a valid 
claim." (Esquivel 11, p.5.) Esquivel's argument lacks factual and legal merit. 
Esquivel mistakenly believes that by meeting the low burden for having counsel 
appointed, he has also met the higher and different burden necessary to avoid 
summarily dismissal. 
The "law of the case" doctrine provides that when an appellate court, "in 
deciding a case presented, states in its opinion a principle or rule of law 
necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, 
and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial 
court and upon subsequent appeal." Tavlor v. Maile, --- ldaho ---, ---, 201 P.3d 
1282, 1286 (2009) (m Suitts v. First Sec. Bank of ldaho, N.A., 110 ldaho 15, 
21, 713 P.2d 1374, 1380 (1985)). 
As a threshold matter, there is no "principle or rule of law" articulated by 
the ldaho Court of Appeals that is contrary to the district court's ruling that 
Esquivel had failed to meet his burden of showing, by competent evidence, that 
his attorney's claimed deficiency resulted in a different sentence. The issue and 
associated burden at play in the earlier proceeding was different than the issue 
and associated burden presented by Esquivel's second amended petition. 
The issue before the ldaho Court of Appeals in Esquivel II was whether 
Esquivel was entitled to appointment of counsel. In order to prevail on this claim, 
Equivel was required to raise the mere possibility of a valid claim: "If an applicant 
alleges facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court should 
appoint counsel in order to give the applicant an opportunity to work with counsel 
and properly allege the necessary supporting facts." Charboneau v. State, 140 
ldaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 11 11 (2004). The result of meeting this standard 
-- by alleging facts that raise the mere possibilify of a valid claim -- is that counsel 
is appointed to help the petitioner meet the next, different standard required to be 
met to continue prosecuting his claim -- to submit verified facts within his 
personal knowledge and produce admissible evidence sufficient to establish a 
prima facie case as to each essential element of the claim. See Berg v. State, 
131 ldaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998) ("A claim for post-conviction relief 
is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 if the applicant "has 
not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element 
of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.") 
Furthermore, even where the applicant does submit competent evidence, 
a district court may also grant summary dismissal where post-conviction 
allegations are affirmatively disproved by the record. Cooper v. State, 96 ldaho 
542, 545, 531 P.2d 11 87, 1190 (1975); Small v. State, 132 ldaho 327, 333-34, 
971 P.2d 1151, 1157-58 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Thus, before the district court, where the present assertion is ineffective 
assistance of counsel and Esquivel's claim is that he was prejudiced by his 
attorney's failure to advise him of his right to remain silent during the 
psychosexual evaluation, Esquivel's burden is to demonstrate this prejudice by a 
preponderance of evidence with competent evidence. Because it is possible to 
assert facts that establish the possibilify of a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel and still not establish that claim by preponderance of evidence and with 
competent evidence, the district court's ruling is not in contradiction with the 
ldaho Court of Appeals' opinion. As such the "law of the case" doctrine is not 
applicable and Esquivel's claim fails. 
D. The District Court's Determination That Esauivel Did Not Meet His Burden 
Of Submittina Facts Supportina His Claim Is Correct 
Esquivel also contends the district court erred in determining that Esquivel 
failed to establish a prima facie claim of prejudice from his counsel's claimed 
deficient performance. ldaho Code Cj 19-4906(c) authorizes a district court to 
summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition upon motion by a party if it appears 
there is "no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." In order to survive summary dismissal, a post- 
conviction petitioner must present evidence in support of his petition sufficient to 
make "a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims upon which 
the applicant bears the burden of proof." Bera v. State, 131 ldaho 517, 518, 960 
P.2d 738, 739 (1998). 
In determining whether an applicant's claim for post-conviction relief is 
subject to summary dismissal, the court is not required to accept a petitioner's 
factual allegations under three circumstances. First, the court is not required to 
accept an applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
evidence. Ferrier v. State, 135 ldaho 797,799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001); State v. 
Roman, 125 ldaho 646, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). To the 
contrary, it is always the applicant's burden to place in evidence the affidavits, 
records (including all relevant transcripts) or other evidence supporting his post- 
conviction claims. I.C. § 19-4903; Roman, 125 ldaho at 648,873 P.2d at 902. 
Second, allegations need not be accepted where they are affirmatively 
disproved by the record of the original criminal proceedings. Cooper v. State, 96 
ldaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975); Small v. State, 132 ldaho 327, 333- 
34, 971 P.2d 1151, 1157-58 (Ct. App. 1998). Thus, a district court properly 
dismisses a petition where at least one element the petitioner must establish is 
"clearly disproved" by the record of the underlying criminal case. Stuart v. State, 
118 ldaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Chouinard v. State, 127 ldaho 
836, 839, 907 P.2d 813, 816 (Ct. App. 1995); Rerninqton v. State, 127 ldaho 443, 
446-47,901 P.2d 134, 137-38 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Finally, because the judge in a post-conviction proceeding "will be the trier 
of fact in the event of an evidentiary proceeding, summary disposition is possible, 
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences to be drawn from the facts, for the 
court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those 
inferences." Haves v. State, 146 ldaho 353, -, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 
2008). 
Application of these legal principles to this case shows that Esquivel has 
failed to show reversible error. As set forth above, the district court recognized 
that at sentencing it had mentioned that it had read the psychosexual evaluation 
in preparation for sentencing and that this was the factual basis that Esquivel 
was relying on to establish prejudice. (#35792 R., pp.92-93.) The district court 
explained that just because it reviewed the psychosexual report, "does not mean, 
however, [that] those items [in the report] become factors in the sentence." 
(#35792 R., p.92.) Indeed, the district court specifically stated that it "determined 
Esquivel's sentence based on the testimony he gave and the evidence produced 
at trial and not on the psychological evaluation" (#35792 R., p.92 (emphasis 
added)), and that the psychosexual told the Court "nothing it did not already 
know" from the trial (#35792 R., p.77). Accordingly, the district court determined 
that Esquivel was not prejudiced by anything in the psychosexual evaluation and 
that his attorney's failure to inform him of his rights prior to completion of that 
evaluation did not constitute facts establishing a reasonable probability that but 
for counsel's deficient performance the results of the sentencing hearing would 
have been different. (#35792 R., p.77.). 
Esquivel has failed to show how this determination was in error. As 
explained by the district court, the fact that the district court mentioned having 
reviewed the psychosexual report is simply not a factual basis sufficient to meet 
his burden of establishing prejudice. As explained by the district court, the mere 
fact that a report is mentioned does not mean that the district court considered 
the report in determining the sentence. (#35792 R., p.92.) Courts review many 
documents, reports, and letters prior to sentencing and just because the court 
states that it has reviewed these items does not necessarily mean that the 
document report or letter influenced the final judgment of the court. 
Consequently, Esquivel has failed to meet his burden of establishing a prima 
facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel because he has failed to allege 
facts that create an issue of fact on the question of prejudice. The fact that the 
state cited the report and that the court mentioned that it had reviewed it in 
preparation for the hearing does not create a genuine issue of material fact. 
Additionally, the district court's ruling clearly explained that the court did 
not consider the information in the psychosexual report in sentencing him: "This 
Court determined Esquivel's sentence based on the testimony he gave and the 
evidence produced at trial and not on the psychological evaluation." (#35792 R., 
p.92.) Further, the court found that the psychosexual evaluation did not provide 
the Court with any information "it did not already know from the trial." (#35792 
R., p.77.) Consequently, to the extent any inference of prejudice could be made 
from mention of the psychosexual evaluation by the district court or by the 
prosecutor, the district court itself "clearly disproved" that claim. 
Moreover, regardless of the district court judge's affirmative statement that 
it did not consider the psychosexual evaluation, the district court judge would 
also have been the judge at an evidentiary hearing. Consequently, the judge 
was free to grant summary disposition "despite the possibility of conflicting 
inferences to be drawn from the facts," in this case the fact that the psychosexual 
evaluation was referenced by the court. See Haves, 146 Idaho at -, 195 P.3d 
at 714. Thus, even if there were conflicting inferences that could be drawn from 
the fact that trial court mentioned the psychosexual evaluation, it was entirely 
proper for the district court, the court that actually imposed the sentence as well 
as the court that would hold the evidentiary hearing, to resolve those inferences. 
In sum, Esquivei's allegations that he was prejudiced by his attorney's 
failure inform him of his rights prior to the psychosexual evaluation fail because 
they do not show his sentence would have been any different. His claim that the 
district court considered the psychosexual evaluation and that consideration 
prejudiced him, was affirmatively disproved by the underlying criminal record and 
was based on inferences properly rejected by the district court. Thus, the district 
court properly dismissed his petition. 
II. 
Esauivel Failed To Preserve An Independent Constitutional lssue For Appeal 
And, Even If He Had. That Araument Lacks Basis In Law 
A. Introduction 
In addition to arguing the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
Esquivel's petition, Esquivel also asserts, for the first time on appeal, that his 
right to remain silent was violated: "[The denial must also be reversed because 
. . . the error in denying Carlos [Esquivel] his right to remain silent must be 
analyzed under the constitutional error standard . . . ." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) 
Esquivel argues that this was not an ineffective assistance of counsel claim but a 
constitutional violation that merely required him to show a deprivation of that right 
occurred, shifting the burden to the state to show harmless error. (Appellant's 
Brief, p.10.) This Court should decline to consider the merits of Esquivel's claim 
because, as a threshold matter, Esquivel never asserted his "right to remain 
silent" was violated below. Additionally, even if Esquivel had raised this issue 
below, Esquivel's allegations do not show his right to remain silent was violated 
and, even if it were, the deprivation was harmless. 
B. Essuivel Failed To Raise A Right To Remain Silent Claim Below And, 
Therefore. Failed To Preserve The lssue For Appeal 
It is a long-standing rule in Idaho that an appellate court will not consider 
issues, including constitutional issues, which are presented for the first time on 
appeal. State v. Martin, 119 ldaho 577, 579, 808 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991); State 
v. Mauro, 121 ldaho 178, 181, 824 P.2d 109, 112 (1991); Small v. State, 132 
ldaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Smith, 130 ldaho 
450, 454, 942 P.2d 574, 578 (Ct. App. 1997). Failure to raise an issue in the 
district court, thereby denying the trial court the opportunity to rule on the alleged 
error, constitutes a waiver of those issues on appeal. m, 11 9 ldaho at 579, 
808 P.2d at 1324; m, 121 ldaho at 181,824 P.2d at 112; Smith, 130 ldaho at 
454, 942 P.2d at 578. 
A review of the record shows Esquivel never claimed that his "right to 
silence" was violated. Esquivel's second amended petition specifically argued 
"ineffective assistance of counsel" claiming "that his trial counsel's failure to 
properly advise him regarding his Fifth Amendment Rights in submitting to a 
psychosexual evaluation amounted to deficient performance." (#35792 R., p.26.) 
There was no "right to silence" claim or any independent constitutional 
violation asserted. Consequently, the district court never ruled on the matter and 
there was no factual development of this claim at the district court level. Having 
failed to even alert the district court to this claim, much less provide the district 
court the opportunity to address the alleged claim, Esquivel failed to preserve his 
claim of error for appellate review. 
C. Even If Esauivel Had Preserved A Separate Constitutional Claim. The 
Claim Has No Basis In Law And To The Extent That It Has A Basis. The 
Claimed Error Was Harmless 
Even if Esquivel preserved this argument it is an argument without basis in 
law. In support of his claim that his attorney's failure to advise him is not a 
proper ineffective assistance of counsel claim but an independent constitutional 
violation, Esquivel relies on State v. Darbin, 109 ldaho 516, 708 P.2d 921 (Ct. 
App. 1985). In m, on direct appeal, the defendant asserted ineffective 
assistance of counsel claiming his attorney deprived him of "the right to testify on 
his own behalf." Id. at 520, 708 P.2d at 925. The ldaho Court of Appeals 
determined that a claim regarding a defendant's right to testify was not a proper 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim because "the decision whether a 
defendant should testify in his own behalf was personal to the defendant and 
could not be made by his counsel as a matter of trial strategy." Id. at 521, 708 
P.2d at 926. Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that the claim was not 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and, as a result, should be evaluated 
as an independent constitutional violation. 
Here, however, there is no invasion on any decision that Esquivel alone 
was required to make, m, whether he would testify at trial. It is uncontroverted 
that Esquivel's claim is based on Estrada v. State, 143 ldaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 
(2006). Indeed, it was the only authority cited by Esquivel in his amended 
second petition. (#35792 R. p.26.) Estrada, however, did not deal with an 
individual's right to testify, but rather a defendant's right to be advised by counsel 
prior to taking a psychosexual examination. In fact, the ldaho Supreme Court 
was explicit that its ruling was "limited to the finding that a defendant has a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel regarding only the decision of whether to submit to a 
psychosexual exam." Id. at 562, 149 P.3d at 838. Furthermore, the ldaho 
Supreme Court made clear that an Estrada violation was properly considered an 
ineffective assistance claim: "We affirm the district court's conclusion that 
Estrada's attorney was deficient in failing to inform his client of this right." @. at 
564, 149 P.3d at 839. Consequently, because Esquivel's "right to testify" was not 
implicated and because the ldaho Supreme Court has evaluated this right only in 
the context of ineffective assistance of counsel, there is no legal basis for 
Esquivel's claim of error. 
Even if Esquivel could establish a constitutional violation regarding his 
psychosexual evaluation, thereby shifting the burden to the state to show 
harmless error, that burden has been met. Error is not reversible unless it is 
prejudicial. State v. Stoddard, 105 ldaho 169, 171, 667 P.2d 272, 274 (Ct. App. 
1983). With limited exceptions, even constitutional error is not necessarily 
prejudicial error. Id. Thus, courts examine whether the alleged error complained 
of is harmless. See State v. Poland, 116 ldaho 34, 37, 773 P.2d 651, 654 (Ct. 
App. 1989). An error is harmless if the appellate court is able to say, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the jury [or fact finder] would have reached the same 
result absent the error. State v. Boman, 123 ldaho 947, 950-51, 854 P.2d 290, 
293-94 (Ct. App. 1993). In sentencing, error is harmless "if it is plain from the 
judge's reasoning that the result would not change or if it appears that any 
different result would represent an abuse of the judge's discretion." @. 
In this case, as set forth above, there was no prejudice and no harm 
resulting from the claimed error. It is clear from the district court's statements 
that its sentencing decision was not based on the psychosexual evaluation but 
on other factors. The sentencing court "determined Esquivel's sentence based 
on the testimony he gave and the evidence produced at trial and not on the 
psychological evaluation." (#35792 R., p.92 (emphasis added).) Consequently, 
regardless of any error associated with the psychosexual evaluation, the district 
court would have imposed the same sentence. Because the district court would 
have imposed the same sentence, there is no prejudice and any error claimed is 
harmless. Consequently, there is no basis for reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
orders dismissing Esquivel's second amended petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 28th day of May 2009. 
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